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Abstract 
This paper distinguishes two reasoning strategies for using a model as a “null”. Null 
modeling evaluates whether a process is causally responsible for a pattern by testing it 
against a null model. Baseline modeling measures the relative significance of various 
processes responsible for a pattern by detecting deviations from a baseline model. Scientists 
sometimes conflate these strategies because their formal similarities, but they must 
distinguish them lest they privilege null models as accepted until disproved. I illustrate this 
problem with the neutral theory of ecology and use this as a case study to draw general 
lessons. First, scientists cannot draw certain kinds of causal conclusions using null modeling. 
Second, scientists can draw these kinds of causal conclusions using baseline modeling, but 
this requires more evidence than does null modeling. 
 
1. Introduction 
Nitecki and Hoffman begin the volume Neutral Models in Biology by saying,  
 “Neutral model” belongs to a whole family of terms, which are sometimes . . . used 
interchangeably; these are “null hypothesis,” “null model,” “random model,” 
“baseline model,” “stochastic approach,” “neutral theory,” etc. (1987, 3) 
This ambiguity remains today. This paper concerns one problematic way that scientists 
reason when they are using reason strategies associated with this family of terms. Leigh Van 
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Valen identified the same problem in a short scientific correspondence in Nature2: 
In the past decade or so a subtle misuse of null hypotheses has become almost 
standard in ecology, biogeography, functional morphology and theoretical 
paleontology . . . The difficulty here comes when a null hypothesis is placed in a 
privileged position, to be accepted at least provisionally until disproved. (1985, 230) 
Yet he explained neither why scientists make this reasoning nor why it is problematic. This 
misuse has surrounded every case of a neutral theory in and around the biological sciences. 
Stephen Hubbell, lead developer of the neutral theory of ecology, stepped right into this 
morass when called his theory “neutral” (Hubbell 2001) and said it played the role of the 
“null” (Hubbell 2005, 2006).  
In this paper, I focus on the case of the neutral theory of ecology and show how 
Hubbell and other ecologists privilege the neutral model qua “null” as accepted until rejected. 
To show why this reasoning does not establish its conclusions, and to enable ecologists to 
state their intended methods, I introduce a distinction between two important methodological 
uses of models: null modeling and baseline modeling. When scientists conflate these 
reasoning strategies, the weaker argument appears the stronger. But when these uses are 
respected, scientists can reason clearly and make strong conclusions.  
 
Null modeling evaluates whether a process is causally responsible for type of pattern 
by testing it against a null model lacking that process. Baseline modeling measures the 
relative significance of various processes responsible for a token instance of a pattern by 
detecting deviations from a baseline model. While the difference between evaluating the 
evidence for a hypothesis and measuring the strength of a process is clear in the abstract, in 
practice these activities are easily run together. In both reasoning strategies, the two models 
used are treated asymmetrically. And the same model may be appropriate for use as a null 
model in one context and as a baseline model in another context. But failing to distinguish 
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these strategies leads to running them together and invalid inferences being drawn. This is 
especially likely when using a neutral model, as continues to happen in community ecology.  
Community ecologists investigate questions such as: How many species of tree are 
there on an island, and why are most of them rare? There is methodological disagreement 
about how to approach answering these questions, and methodological positions track the 
theory being used. Ecologists using competition theory look for the differences between 
species that make a difference to their geography and abundance. They first try to understand 
observed patterns as the result of competition between differentially adapted species for 
limited resources. Every species has its own fundamental niche and each individual works to 
extend its realized niche at the cost of others. Why is one tree species so much more 
abundant than another? They first hypothesize that the species is better adapted to the 
conditions.  
Ecologists using neutral theory, in contrast, start by assuming that there are no 
relevant differences between species and that every individual, regardless of species, is 
functionally equivalent. They first try to understand observed patterns as the result of history 
and chance. They first hypothesize that the reason why one tree species is more abundant 
than another is because it was either more abundant in the past or in the surrounding area. 
The methodological issue I address in this paper arises when the ecologists invoke the 
neutral model as a “null” with respect to competition models. As I explain in detail below, 
because a neutral model is neutral and so leaves out species differences, some ecologists treat 
it and a competition model including species differences asymmetrically. I claim the users of 
neutral theory sometimes fail to distinguish when they are null modeling from when they are 
baseline modeling.  
The following argument represents the reasoning, made by various users of neutral 
theory, that I critique in this paper:  
1. The neutral theory of ecology supplies the appropriate null model for testing 
competition theory with respect a pattern of interest.  
2. The neutral model fits the pattern of interest well enough and so fails to be rejected 
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for that pattern.  
3. Therefore, history and chance, and not interspecific competition, are the dominant 
causes of that pattern of interest. 
This argument privileges the neutral theory as accepted until rejected. I argue that this 
argument does not follow because the reasoning strategy that produces it conflates null 
modeling and baseline modeling. Distinguishing between null and baseline modeling 
explains why the reasoning fails and how it may arise.  
The same faulty reasoning is liable to emerge whenever scientists employ any of the 
terms mentioned by Nitecki and Hoffman. We should examine cases where a scientific 
theory supplies the “null hypothesis” but classical statistics seems to be absent (Bausman and 
Halina). But this illegitimate privileging is liable to accompany the use of any “neutral 
theory” in biology. Kimura’s neutral theory of molecular evolution (1983) and the Woods 
Hole Group’s MBL model of paleobiology (Raup et al. 1973) are only the most prominent 
examples of neutral theories. Scientists continue to develop neutral theories for life histories 
(Steiner and Tuljapurkar 2012), wealth accumulation (Fargione et al. 2011), and language 
dynamics (Blythe 2012), and the reasoning strategies used in each of these cases should be 
analyzed.  
 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the history of these 
methodological issues. Sections 3-5 characterizes and distinguishes null modeling and 
baseline modeling. Section 6 introduces the neutral theory of ecology. Section 7 shows how 
its use has shifted between null modeling and baseline modeling. Section 8 argues for how 
and why a hybrid reasoning strategy that shifts from null modeling to baseline modeling can 
privilege a neutral model and why the corresponding argument fails. It fails because not only 
are null modeling and baseline modeling distinct, but baseline modeling requires more 
support than null modeling. This support cannot, however, come from the neutrality of the 
model. 
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2. Background 
Null modeling is distinct from statistical null hypothesis testing. The relevant 
difference for this paper is that null modeling tests the hypothesis that a process is causally 
responsible for a type of pattern, while null hypothesis testing tests the hypothesis that a 
pattern was due to sampling error, measurement error, or randomness and independent 
causes. When the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, no more explanation is sought. Null 
modeling and baseline modeling are properly pursued after the appropriate null hypothesis 
has been rejected. However, the distinction between null hypothesis testing and null 
modeling was slow to emerge. And so many critiques of null hypotheses carry over to null 
modeling.  
When Van Valen identified null hypotheses being illegitimately privileged, Strong, 
Simberloff, and colleagues were attempting to put ecology on sounder scientific footing. 
Strong and Simberloff base their image of good science on Popper’s conjecture-and-
refutation conceptual scheme, urging ecologists to adopt falsificationist practices by 
emphasizing the role of testing null hypotheses and null models: 
We propose another possibility with logical primacy over other hypotheses, that other 
hypotheses must first be tested against . . . This is the null hypothesis that community 
characteristics are apparently random. (Strong Jr, Szyska, and Simberloff 1979, 910) 
They meant that, until you exclude the appropriate null hypothesis, the fit between your 
alternative hypothesis and the data gives no evidence for your hypothesis.  
Quinn and Dunham (1983) demonstrate the mistake made by Simberloff and Strong’s 
argument for using null hypotheses. Rather than assigning logical primacy to randomness in 
when testing hypotheses, applied statisticians use null hypotheses to estimate the relative 
importance of factors not included in the null hypothesis, factors already assumed to be 
relevant. Sloep (1986) argues that Strong and Simberloff’s proposed methodology for testing 
null hypotheses is mistaken because their null and alternative hypotheses overlap while 
statistical hypothesis testing requires that they be exclusive. But these critiques have not 
stuck in biology.  
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Wimsatt (1987), in his contribution to Neutral Models in Biology, distinguishes 12 
different uses of “false” models, of which he takes “neutral models” to be an instance. Some 
of these uses are similar to how I characterize null modeling and baseline modeling.3 But 
Wimsatt is interested in neither explaining these reasoning strategies in detail nor cases 
where they are mixed together to ill-effect. He also continues the ambiguous terminology of 
the volume, saying  
Neutral models in biology represent “baseline models” or “null hypotheses” for 
testing the . . . efficacy of selection processes by trying to estimate what would 
happen in their absence. (1987, 52) 
Beatty (1987) critiques the use of Kimura’s neutral theory of molecular evolution as a 
“null hypothesis” in the context of the debate between the neutralists and adaptationists. 
Beatty (1997) shows that while the debate between the neutralists and adaptationists was 
framed as an exclusive choice, in fact both neutral drift and selection were being apportioned 
relative significance. Huss (Huss 2004) shows how the Woods Hole Group used the MBL in 
paleobiology as both a null hypothesis and a null model. Gotelli and Graves (1996, 3) give 
clear examples of models used as null models across ecology and remains the only general 
book on null modeling in any science. But they define a null model and I do not find their 
definition useful because to be a null model is just to be used in null modeling.  
Regarding the neutral theory of ecology, Gotelli and McGill (2006)  distinguish using 
it as null from it being neutral, correcting the common conflation of these two terms. 
Rosindell and colleagues (2012, 205) distinguish between using the neutral theory of ecology 
as a null model and as an approximation and argue that you cannot do both at the same time. 
This is similar to my distinction, but baseline modeling is more than use as an approximation 
and their analysis does not distinguish these uses and their associated reasoning strategies. 
Odenbaugh (forthcoming) distinguishes between being null and being causal and argues for 
using the neutral theory as a causal theory much as I characterize baseline modeling. But no 
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one has appreciated how these strategies conflated into a single reasoning strategy which 
privileges a neutral theory. Therefore, I continue this critical dialectic and extend it to the 
case of the neutral theory of ecology. The distinction between null modeling and baseline 
modeling needs to be sharpened and honed. More cases can then be analyzed using this 
distinction. 
 
3. Null Modeling 
Null modeling tests a hypothesis that a set of processes is causally responsible for a 
set of types of patterns. Null modeling takes place in the following context. Scientists 
identify a type of target pattern (or set of patterns) which calls for causal explanation. 
Scientists form their original hypothesis that a set of original processes is causally 
responsible for the target pattern. One way to evaluate this hypothesis is to first formalize the 
processes into a mathematical model. If they formalize the original hypothesis into the 
original model, then they can determine whether the original model suffices to produce the 
target patterns. If it is sufficient, this is evidence for the original hypothesis. But even if the 
original model suffices, the original hypothesis might still be false. Stronger evidence is 
needed. 
Enter null modeling. Null modeling begins by finding or constructing a model that 
excludes the proposed original process and that formalizes a set of processes which, if 
sufficient, would undermine the need for the original processes. The processes formalized in 
the null model may be either simpler in some way than the original processes, or else be a 
strict subset of the processes in the original model. The null model is null with respect to the 
original processes and is appropriate for playing the role of the null model for some set of 
original models. Null modeling tests the processes included in the original model and 
excluded from the null model.  
Null modeling is based on two core ideas. First, if the null model suffices to produce 
the target patterns, this undermines the evidence for the original hypothesis inferred from the 
fit of the original model to the pattern, as the original processes have been shown 
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unnecessary. Second, if the null model cannot produce the target patterns, then the evidence 
for the original hypothesis inferred from the fit of the original model to the pattern stands, as 
it shows that a set of processes that are weaker than the original processes are insufficient. 
I characterize the Null Modeling Reasoning Strategy as follows. Assume scientists 
have already shown that the original model has already suffices to produce the pattern of 
interest and set standards for whether a model suffices to produce a pattern. 
1. Select a model as an appropriate null model to test whether the original processes are 
causally relevant to a target pattern. 
2. Compare the null model’s outputs with the target pattern. The null model is either 
sufficient or insufficient to produce the target pattern. 
3. If the null model is sufficient, then 
3.1. Reject the original model, and  
3.2. Undermine the evidence for the original hypothesis gained from model-fit. 
4. If the null model is insufficient, then  
4.1. Reject the null model, and  
4.2. Let stand the evidence for the original hypothesis gained from model-fit.  
Null modeling is not a method for choosing between two hypotheses, theories, or 
models. It is a method for evaluating one hypothesis about the causal responsibility of a set 
of processes for certain patterns. The two models are treated asymmetrically: the original 
hypothesis is tested by the null model, but not vice versa. Only the original hypothesis can 
gain evidence. However, there is nothing preventing a model from playing the role of the null 
model in one case and playing the role of the original model in another case. Models are not 
inherently null, although a model may be appropriate or inappropriate for playing the role of 
a null with respect to another model. 
For example, null modeling was first used in ecology to evaluate whether competition 
between species of different genera are causally relevant to the ratio of the number of species 
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to the number of genera in a community (species to genus ratio or S/G).4 The null model used 
for testing the original process of intra-generic competition was a model which included no 
generic differences across individuals and which distributed individuals to areas randomly 
(with respect to genus). The null model produced similar S/Gs to those observed and this 
undermined the evidence for intra-generic competition on S/Gs.  
 
4. Baseline Modeling 
Scientists use baseline modeling to apportion relative causal responsibility for token 
patterns in the following context. Scientists accept that multiple processes are jointly 
responsible for producing types of patterns. They want to determine the relative contribution 
of each process in token cases. 
Baseline modeling proceeds by first establishing what we would expect to observe if 
only a subset of accepted processes were contributing to a pattern. The baseline model 
formalizes this subset of processes. The additional model formalizes the remainder of the 
accepted processes. Deviations from the baseline model’s output and token patterns are 
explained by invoking the additional processes as causally responsible on top of the baseline 
processes. This estimates the relative significance of baseline and additional processes to the 
token pattern of interest. If the additional processes understood and modeled, then the 
strength of these processes can be measured. There can be more than two sets of processes—
baseline and additional. The additional processes can be subdivided and measured separately 
by iterating the same reasoning. 
I characterize the Baseline Modeling Reasoning Strategy as follows.  
1. Select a model as an appropriate baseline model to apportion relative significance to 
multiple processes, each of which is relevant to the type of target pattern. 
2. Compare the baseline model’s outputs with a token target pattern and prove either 
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sufficient or insufficient to produce it.5 
3. If the outputs are sufficient, then  
3.1. Conclude that the baseline processes dominate the additional processes in 
producing the token pattern. 
4. If the outputs are insufficient, then  
4.1. Conclude that the additional processes dominate the baseline modeling in 
producing the token pattern.  
The two models are treated asymmetrically: baseline modeling measures the baseline 
responsibility first and then uses the additional processes to fill the gap, but not vice versa. In 
this way, baseline modeling proceeds by assuming that the baseline model accurately 
describes the system, both in the complete absence of additional processes and to a degree 
that is inversely proportional to the strength of additional processes. Models are not 
inherently baselines, although a model may be appropriate or inappropriate for playing the 
role of a baseline with respect to certain additional processes. 
 For example, physicists use baseline modeling to detect and measure the force of 
gravity on the motion of heavenly bodies. The principle of inertia supplies the baseline model 
with which accelerations qua deviations are detected. The law of gravitation supplies the 
additional model with which the distance and mass of the influencing body can be estimated 
from the strength of the force.  
 
5. Null modeling vs. Baseline Modeling 
The formal similarity of null and baseline modeling facilitates their conflation. Both 
reasoning strategies use two models and treat them asymmetrically. The null and baseline 
models are both compared with data prior to their counterparts, and model-fit obtained 
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informs a judgment about the original hypothesis and additional processes. But they differ 
from each other along four dimensions: empirical target, purpose, context, and commitment. 
Empirical Target: The empirical target of null modeling is a type of pattern and its 
variation across cases. Examples of types of patterns include the motions of bodies, the 
behaviors of gases, and climate change. 
The empirical target of baseline modeling is a token instance of a pattern. Examples 
of types of patterns include the current motion of the Earth around the Sun, how the pressure 
of hydrogen changes as the temperature rises and the volume is fixed, and the warming trend 
in Earth’s climate. 
Purpose: The purpose of null modeling is to test for the causal relevance of a set of 
processes to a type of pattern. A process is causally relevant to a pattern just in case it is 
sometimes a cause of the pattern. Examples of such tests include whether there is a fifth force 
(beyond the electromagnetic, strong, weak, and gravitational forces) relevant to the motion of 
bodies, whether inter-molecular forces are relevant to the behavior of gases, and whether 
anthropogenic activities are relevant to climate change. 
The purpose of baseline modeling is to apportion relative responsibility across 
multiple processes relevant to token patterns. A process is responsible to a token pattern to 
the degree to which it makes a difference in the case. Examples of such apportioning include 
gravitational and electromagnetic forces acting on the motion of the Earth around the Sun, 
collisions and intermolecular forces acting on the pressure of hydrogen, and anthropogenic 
and non-anthropogenic causes of the warming trend. 
Context: The methodological context of null modeling is evidence. Null modeling 
evaluates the evidence for the causal responsibility of a process for a type of pattern. 
Judgements of such evaluations include that there is insufficient evidence for the existence of 
a fifth force, that inter-molecular forces are relevant to the behavior of gases, and that 
anthropogenic activities are relevant to climate change. 
 The methodological context of baseline modeling is explanation. Baseline modeling 
measures and causally explains a token pattern in terms of the relative responsibility of 
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multiple processes. Examples of such causal explanation include that gravitation dominates 
electromagnetic forces in the orbit of the Earth around the Sun, that collisions dominate 
intermolecular forces in the behavior of hydrogen gas, and that anthropogenic activities make 
a difference to the warming trend of the Earth. 
 Commitment: Null modeling is agnostic concerning whether the null model accurately 
represents, or can feature in a causal explanation of, the target system. Therefore, possible 
outcomes of null modeling make positive claims only about the original hypothesis. The 
criteria for being an appropriate null model depend only on the relationship between the 
original model and the null model. This is why null models are null with respect to their 
original model.  
 Baseline modeling requires that the baseline model accurately represents, or can 
feature in a causal explanation of, the behavior of the target system in the absence of 
additional causal processes. Therefore, baseline processes are afforded some degree (possibly 
zero) of causal responsibility, no matter the model-fit of the baseline model to the target 
system. The criteria for being an appropriate baseline model depend only on the relationships 
between the baseline model and the target system.  
 It is easy to see how one could fail to distinguish between null modeling and baseline 
modeling. But failing to make this distinction is not hypothetical. Ecologists using neutral 
theory continue to make it.  
 
6. The Neutral Theory of Ecology 
Community ecologists study biodiversity and biogeography. They are interested in 
the abundances and diversity of organisms, and how these distributions vary across space and 
time. Some restrict themselves to studying single trophic-level communities. A single tropic-
level community comprises all the organisms at the same energy level in the same place. One 
contains only organisms that eat, and are eaten by, the same kinds of things. For example, all 
the trees in a forest are studied as a single trophic-level community, as are all the birds on an 
island with raptors excluded. In what follows, I refer only to single trophic-level 
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communities. 
One pattern investigated in communities are relative species abundance distributions 
(SAD). There are three stages to constructing a SAD. First, ecologists sample a community, 
or in rare cases census it, and record the species of every individual. Second, they drop 
names of the species from the data to permit comparisons across communities which may not 
possess the same mix of species. Now the data include only the number of species and the 
number of individuals in each species.  
Third, they represent these data as a curve on a graph. A Dominance-Diversity plot, 
one such type of representation, has axes of percent relative species abundance (on log10 
scale) and species rank in abundance. Figure 1 compares five SADs on a Dominance-
Diversity plot: 
 
Figure 1 - from (Hubbell 2001). 
 
Read a point on a line as: “the xth ranked species makes up y% of the community”. A SAD is 
a representation of data on a graph.  
 The patterns of abundance and diversity, including SADs, are types of general 
patterns. They exhibit variation in form across token instances. When you compare SADs of 
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distinct communities, you typically see an ‘S’ shape—steep, then flatter, then steeper—
showing that most species are rare and few are common. The S-shape of SADs is robust 
across and within many types of communities and calls for explanation. 
Community ecologists want to describe, predict, and explain tokens and types of 
SADs. Competition theory is the traditional way of approaching such problems. 6 Ecologists 
using competition theory hypothesize that the competitive differences between individuals of 
distinct species are the most important causal factors relevant to SADs: every species is best 
adapted to a set of resources and conditions, called its niche, by natural selection. When two 
species live in the same area, the species that better succeeds at utilizing the available 
resources will likely outcompete the other. The competitive exclusion principle generalizes 
this idea, stating that, if there are insufficient differences between how two species utilize 
resources and affect their environment, then those two species cannot stably coexist. One 
species will eventually exclude the other. The general process responsible for this is 
interspecific competition and is increasingly referred to as selection (Vellend 2016).  
In direct contrast, users of neutral theory hypothesize that patterns of biodiversity and 
biogeography result from chance and history. According to neutral theory, a tree lives where 
it does, not because its species is best adapted to specific local conditions, but because that 
spot was recently vacated and seeds happened to land there. The ability to disperse seeds or 
young to areas with open resources is one of the most important causal factors. To a first 
approximation, organisms of every species are equally able to disperse to and colonize any 
open space.  
Stephen Hubbell constructed neutral theory to counter proposals that interspecific 
competition causes the patterns of abundance and diversity. The neutral theory of ecology 
has three independent characteristics. First, it hypothesizes three ecological processes: drift, 
immigration, and speciation. Ecological drift is random death and birth in a community, also 
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called demographic stochasticity. Immigration disperses individuals between different 
regions. And speciation results in the birth of an individual of a novel species. This set of 
demographic and dispersal processes controls how SADs can change over time.7 
Demographic and dispersal processes are chancy, historical processes because the SAD at 
any given time results from both its previous state and the probabilities that some individual 
dies, gives birth, immigrates, and is a member of a new species.  
Second, neutral theory assumes neutrality. Neutrality states that all individuals in a 
community, regardless of species, are functionally equivalent. In a neutral-demographic-
dispersal theory, individuals have identical chances of dying, giving birth, immigrating, and 
giving birth to an individual of a new species. Assuming neutrality rules out the process of 
interspecific competition since this requires competitive differences between species. 
Third, neutral theory assumes saturation. Saturation implies that a community’s size 
is approximately fixed. This ensures competition for space between species. But, coupled 
with neutrality, this is competition between equals. In a saturated neutral community, 
interspecific competition does not differ from intraspecific competition. 
A neutral model of the neutral theory of ecology is a mathematical model that 
formalizes the assumptions made and processes hypothesized by the theory. The mathematics 
of a neutral model can be interpreted as follows: imagine a community as a finite 
checkerboard with J spaces where an individual can live.8 Fill the board with pieces of 
various colors drawn from a bag. Each piece represents an individual and each color 
represents a species. The board represents the island or local community and the bag 
represents the mainland or metacommunity. Ascertain the SAD of the board at a time by 
counting the number of colors and individuals of each color on the board and representing 
                                                          
7 There is a philosophical debate over whether genetic drift is really a causal process and 
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(Millstein 2002) and (Clatterbuck 2015).  
8 Depicting the neutral model of ecology as a checkerboard has been used by (Rosindell et al. 
2012). 
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this data on a graph. 
The neutral model describes how the board’s SAD can change over time and predicts 
the time-independent equilibrium SAD arrived in the long run. The neutral model is a 
discrete-time model. Each turn consists of removing a piece and refilling the space with a 
new piece to maintain constant community size. With the board filled, begin by removing a 
piece according to the death rule: each piece on the board has an equal chance of being 
removed. To satisfy saturation, fill the opening. Fill the open space either by a local birth or 
by immigration. With probability 1-m, replace the death with a piece according to the birth 
rule: each piece on the board has an equal chance of reproducing and filling the space. To 
satisfy neutrality, the probability that a piece of a given color will fill the space is just 
proportional to the current relative abundance of that color. With probability m, replace a 
death according to the immigration rule: each piece in the bag has an equal chance of 
immigrating and filling the space. Under only drift (birth and death), local species diversity 
will tend to decrease. Immigration increases local diversity by drawing individuals from the 
metacommunity, where it decreases diversity.  
Altogether then, the SAD of the board evolves through the following steps: 
1. Remove a piece from the board following the death rule and go to step 2. 
2. Fill the gap on the board with either step 2.1 or step 2.2 and then return to step 1. 
2.1. With probability 1-m, fill the gap with a piece on the board reproducing 
following the birth rule—each piece on the board has an equal chance of 
reproducing and filling the space. 
2.2. With probability m, fill the gap with a piece from the immigrating bag following 
the immigration rule—each piece in the bag has an equal chance of immigrating 
and filling the space. 
Notice that the dynamics of the board involve the SAD of the bag. For immigration to 
work, the dynamics of a metacommunity must also be tracked, and this follows analogous 
death and birth rules. Here drift and emigration occur, balanced by speciation instead of 
immigration. The simplest speciation rule (used in the point mutation model) states: replace a 
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death in the bag of size JM by an individual from a novel species with probability ν. 
Speciation is the ultimate diversity source. The diversity produced by speciation is dispersed 
to the local community, where it is counters drift as the ultimate diversity sink.  
After many rounds of death and replacement in both the bag and on the board, a time-
independent equilibrium SAD will probably be reached. In equilibrium, diversity is the 
balance of speciation and drift, like the level of water in a sink is at equilibrium is the balance 
of inflow and outflow rates. This equilibrium SAD does not depend on the initial 
configuration of the board, only on the values of the free parameters J, m, and θ (a function 
of JM and ν). The neutral model outputs a statistical distribution which can be compared to 
observed SADs in two ways.9 First, variations in the outputs of the neutral model are studied 
to understand the variation in outputs possible and the sensitivity of the outputs on the free 
parameters. Second, parameter values are set and the output distribution is compared with 
token SADs so that model-fit can be measured. Cases of very good model-fit have are 
obtained, especially for tropical forest plots. Poor model-fits to SADs are also obtained. The 
conclusions that can be inferred from good and bad model-fit depends on the reasoning 
strategy being used. 
 
7. Hubbell’s Uses of the Neutral Theory 
I want to understand both why privileging a neutral theory as accepted until rejected 
is illegitimate and how such a privileging could come about. Section 8 will explain both as 
the result of conflating null and baseline modeling. But this conflation is not hypothetical. 
This section shows that null and baseline modeling are inseparable from the development of 
the neutral theory. Hubbell shifted from using the neutral model as a null model for testing 
competition theory to using the neutral model as a baseline model for detecting interspecific 
competition. And when another ecologist presented Hubbell with a choice between these two 
reasoning strategies, Hubbell failed to choose.  
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7.1. Hubbell’s Use of the Community Drift Model 
Hubbell developed the ancestor of the neutral theory, the community drift model, for 
tropical forest ecology (1979). The community drift model includes only drift and 
immigration, and assumes saturation and neutrality. As we can see from the conclusions he 
draws, Hubbell used the community drift model only as a null model for testing the role of 
interspecific competition in shaping tropical forest patterns. 
Hubbell drew two conclusions from the comparison of the community drift model 
with SADs. First, he stated,  
we may expect to observe substantial differentiation of the relative abundance of 
species in natural communities as a result of . . . a kind of “community drift” 
phenomenon. (1979, 1307) 
By varying the free parameters of the model, a wide variety of SADs can be approximated. 
This shows that the community drift model can fit the general diversity of observed SADs. 
Hubbell also fit the community drift model’s output to the token SAD of the tropical dry 
forest studied and showed that a close fit could be obtained by inputting the known 
community size and fitting the immigration parameter value. These results were surprising 
given the expectation that interspecific competition dominates.  
 Second, he claimed,  
we cannot necessarily conclude that, just because a species is of rank-1 importance in 
a community, its current success is due to competitive dominance . . . stemming from 
some superior adaptation to the local environment. (1979, 1307) 
The ability of the community drift model to fit observed SADs and their variation shows that 
interspecific competition is not required to explain either SADs or the dominance of a 
species. This undermined the evidence for interspecific competition as a cause of those 
patterns based on model-fit. Hubbell drew no further causal conclusions about the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
9 For rigorous descriptions of the mathematics of the neutral theory, see (Hubbell 2001), 
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responsibility of random drift or immigration from the model-fit of the neutral model. His 
conclusions follow from null modeling. 
 
7.2 Hubbell’s Use of the Neutral Theory of Ecology 
Hubbell (2001) later developed the community drift model into a general, positive 
theory of abundance and diversity in all communities, named The Unified Neutral Theory of 
Biodiversity and Biogeography. This coincides with his first use of baseline modeling. But he 
did not distinguish this from null modeling. 
Terborgh, Foster, and Nuñez (1996, 564) used the community drift model as a null 
model for testing interspecific competition in a series of forest plots in Peru. Their target 
pattern was the observation that the same species were most abundant across a set of five 
forest plots. They argued that such correlated abundances were very unlikely given the 
community drift model. Therefore, using it as a null model, they claimed to show 
interspecific competition to be a cause of abundance patterns and the most abundant species 
are the best competitors in that region. 
Hubbell responded to this challenge in 2001. He showed that, because immigration 
connected the five sites in a river valley, neutral theory almost always predicts that the most 
abundant species in one local community will be the commonest species in another local 
community. Therefore, he did not reject the neutral model (with or without speciation) qua 
null model and did not invoke interspecific competition. So far, his usage is consistent with 
neutral theory’s supplying only a null model. 
Yet, where Hubbell had stopped at the negative conclusion regarding the lack of 
support for interspecific competition, he now pressed the argument further. While some 
correlation between the commonest species did not show the importance of interspecific 
competition, the degree of correlation in which the commonest species dominate the other 
abundant species did show this. By comparing the observed correlation with the expectation 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(Volkov et al. 2003), and (Etienne and Alonso 2007).  
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given neutrality, Hubbell estimated that this ecological dominance deviation showed a 6% 
fitness advantage in the commonest species (2001, 337). He thereby explained a token 
pattern of correlated abundance using neutral theory as a baseline model. 
Hubbell’s baseline use is the only time in the book he describes his reasoning using 
“null”:  
What they did not comment on, however, was the excessive dominance itself—
presumably because they had no prior statistical hypothesis of what null relative 
abundance distribution to expect. (2001, 336) 
 Looking forward, Hubbell and other ecologists continue to use the neutral theory to 
draw two kinds of causal conclusions about ecological communities. These causal 
conclusions will feature in section 8 where I use them to characterize and critique the 
reasoning strategy being used to privilege the neutral theory. First, Hubbell and colleagues 
draw negative conclusions: 
Species interactions, niche partitioning, or density-dependence, while they may be 
present, do not appear to enhance tree species richness at Barro Colorado. (Condit, 
Chisholm, and Hubbell 2012, 1) 
This is a negative conclusion about the lack of responsibility of several processes linked to 
interspecific competition in one community. Second, Hubbell and colleagues draw positive 
conclusions: 
The neutral model predicts diversity and abundance at Barro Colorado because it 
properly describes what matters most—species input [neutral speciation]—while 
ignoring irrelevant details. (Condit, Chisholm, and Hubbell 2012, 5) 
This is a positive causal conclusion about the relative significance of multiple processes in 
one community, measured by detecting deviations from the neutral model’s predictions. The 
strength of both kinds of conclusions depends upon the reasoning strategy used to infer them.  
At the time of writing his book, Hubbell had so far remained practical, never 
explicitly addressing the methodological issues raised by neutral theory. But this soon 
changed. 
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7.3. Bell’s Weak vs. Strong Distinction 
 Just as Hubbell debuted the unified neutral theory in 2001 as a positive and general 
theory, ecologist Bell introduced an important methodological choice and explained the 
difference the choice would make.  
Bell said that the success of the neutral model raised an important question with 
practical importance for community ecologists: What should ecologists infer from the 
success of the neutral theory? He gave two answers, ecologists can either use the neutral 
theory in a “weak” or a “strong” way (2001, 2418). The weak use is agnostic regarding 
whether the success of the neutral model shows that it captures the underlying processes of 
real communities and justifies causal explanations. “The role of the NCM [neutral 
community model] is then restricted to providing the appropriate null hypothesis [null 
model10] when evaluating patterns of abundance and diversity . . . ” (2001, 2418). Ecologists 
can use the neutral theory in the weak way to evaluate the evidence of other hypotheses and 
theories of patterns abundance and diversity.  
The strong use makes a stronger commitment. “The strong version is that the NCM is 
so successful precisely because it has correctly identified the principal mechanism underlying 
patterns of abundance and diversity . . . ” (2001, 2418). Ecologists can use the neutral theory 
in the strong way to explain observed patterns and to unify disparate ecological phenomena 
in terms of neutral drift, immigration, and speciation. The strong use does not require that the 
neutral theory explain everything in its domain perfectly. Bell acknowledged that species 
differences are sometimes causally relevant to patterns of abundance and argued that the 
strong use enables detecting when interspecific competition is causally important by seeing 
when the theory fails to give adequate predictions. The strong use is almost baseline 
modeling.  
                                                          
10 Bell distinguished null hypothesis testing from null modeling (in other terminology) in his 
other methodological paper about neutral theory (Bell 2000).  
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 Hubbell (2006) responded to Bell’s choice.11 Hubbell began by answering the 
question, ‘what can ecologists do with a neutral model?’:  
We obtain a quantitative null hypothesis against which to test when, to what extent, 
and for which species demographic differences among species are necessary to 
explain observed community patterns. The UNT [unified neutral theory] is a 
nontraditional approach because it does not postulate differences among species as 
the point of departure, but only adds them when necessary to explain the observed 
data. (2006, 1387) 
While he couched this in ‘null hypothesis’ terminology, he intended determining the extent to 
which species differences matter when detecting deviation with neutral models. Ecologists 
should first explain observed patterns are using the neutral drift, immigration, and speciation, 
and then add species differences. This is baseline modeling. 
Next, Hubbell segued into the general problem that neutral patterns do not imply 
neutral processes, a version of the underdetermination problem. He said, 
I agree, but obtaining acceptable fits from neutral models shifts the burden of proof to 
those who would assert that more complex theory is required to explain nature and 
with what level of detail and generality. (2006, 1387) 
Because the theory is neutral, it shifts the burden of proof onto competition models to reject 
the neutral model first. The neutrality assumption breaks the underdetermination problem. 
Here he also shifts back from explaining one SAD to undermining the evidence for 
interspecific competition as a general cause of SADs.  
 Hubbell then argued that the empirical success owing to the great model-fits is strong 
evidence that the neutral theory accurately captures something about patterns of abundance 
                                                          
11 Leigh (2007) observed that this was the first place Hubbell uses “null”, which is almost 
correct. Hubbell discusses the issue in his paper on neutral theory and Stephen Jay Gould 
(2005), in which he draws the connection to the MBL model. And the once in the book 
mentioned in 7.1.  
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and diversity, supporting the strong use and baseline modeling.12 But he closed the opening 
section by saying that, irrespective of its eventual fate, it will remain useful as a null model.  
What then are we to make of Hubbell’s response to Bell? This depends on his 
position on the weak vs. strong question. One position he defends is that the neutral theory 
will remain useful as a null model even if it is not useful as a baseline model. This Weak-if-
not-Strong position is defensible. But he also defends using the neutral theory as both a null 
model and a baseline model. This Weak-and-Strong position is vulnerable and I will 
undermine it in section 8. There is a basic tension between the weak use and the strong use. 
The results of using the neutral model qua null model can undermine support for ever 
invoking interspecific competition. But using the neutral model qua baseline model always 
invokes interspecific competition as an actual cause. There would be no conflict if the neutral 
model perfectly fit every SAD, but the world does not abide.  
Despite the rhetoric of undermining interspecific competition as a cause, interspecific 
competition remains accepted, including by Hubbell. But thanks in part to Hubbell, many 
more ecologists accept drift, immigration, and speciation as important causes of patterns of 
abundance.13 At stake is the relative significance of these various processes in particular 
cases within the context of explanation. This is part of the resolution sought. Hubbell shifted 
from using the community drift model as a null model to using the neutral theory as a 
baseline model. But he continued to couch his baseline modeling within the framework of 
null modeling. Hubbell should have respected the distinction between null modeling and 
baseline modeling. We can at last diagnose and cure the combined reasoning strategy that 
begins by using the neutral theory as a null model and ends by measuring the relative 
significance of all the processes.  
 
                                                          
12 The current consensus in ecology is that this is extremely weak evidence for any theory. 
Fitting patterns such as SADs is too easy and can be done with too many models. 
13 See (Vellend 2016) for the theory containing all four processes, called “The Theory of 
Community Ecology” after Hubbell’s theory.  
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8. Prognosis Negative 
 I introduced the distinction between null modeling and baseline modeling to diagnose 
how theories are illegitimately privileged as accepted until rejected. Section 7 showed that 
this distinction is not foreign to the neutral theory of ecology, but that they have grown up 
together. It also showed that Hubbell switched between and sometimes conflated this 
distinction. 
I can now show my reconstruction of the reasoning strategy used to privilege the 
neutral theory of ecology. Hubbell and various other ecologists have used it when discussing 
the neutral theory as a “null”. It begins with using the neutral theory as a “null” and ends 
with drawing the kinds causal conclusions about relative significance shown just above at the 
end of section 7. And no one should use it anymore. 
Neutral–Null–Baseline Reasoning Strategy 
1. The neutral theory supplies the appropriate null model for testing whether 
interspecific competition is causally relevant to patterns of abundance and diversity, 
including SADs. 
2. When comparing the neutral model with the targeted SADs, it is either sufficient or 
insufficient to produce the targeted SADs. 
3. If it is sufficient, then 
3.1. Conclude that some combination of random drift, immigration, and speciation 
dominates interspecific competition in producing the SADs targeted. 
4. If it is insufficient, then 
4.1. Conclude that interspecific competition dominates random drift, immigration, 
and speciation. 
This reasoning strategy is problematic, first, because its serves rhetorically to 
privilege the neutral theory over its rivals (non-neutral, selection-based theories) in a way 
that covers its weaknesses. It is the privilege of a neutral theory to shift the burden of 
disproof onto its rivals while retaining the benefit of the doubt for itself. Because neutral 
theory ignores species differences, it provides an appropriate null model for testing 
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interspecific competition. This shifts the burden of disproof to competition theory, forcing 
neutral model to be rejected before interspecific competition can ever be invoked. Also, 
because neutral theory ignores species differences, we expect the processes of random drift, 
immigration, and speciation to act in the absence of interspecific competition. This gives the 
neutral theory the benefit of the doubt, allowing it to identify neutral demographic and 
dispersal processes as the dominant causes of the patterns of interest without comparing a 
neutral model with a competition model. Taken together, these two features mean that neutral 
processes are accepted as dominating until the neutral model can be rejected.  
 Second, this reasoning strategy is problematic because it does not yield strong reasons 
for accepting its conclusions. The privilege is not a legitimate sign of the virtues of neutral 
theories because it produces bad arguments. Take an application of the neutral–null–baseline 
reasoning strategy to some targeted patterns, such as the example I gave in section 1. The 
argument generated begins with the neutral theory supplying the null model for testing 
competition theory. The fit will be either sufficient or insufficient, and so either one set of 
processes or the other dominates. This reasoning strategy sanctions inferences to causal 
responsibility irrespective of how well the neutral model fits the patterns of interest. Why are 
these conclusions unjustified? This depends on how the neutral–null–baseline reasoning 
strategy is analyzed. There are four cases to consider. 
Case 1: The reasoning could follow from null modeling. But if we were null 
modeling, the only possible positive conclusion would be that interspecific competition is 
causally relevant to the patterns of interest. Instead, no matter if the neutral model is 
sufficient or insufficient to fit the patterns of interest, positive causal conclusions about the 
relative significance of multiple processes follow. Neutral–Null–Baseline Reasoning Strategy 
is invalid if understood as null modeling. 
 Case 2: The reasoning could follow from baseline modeling. In this case, we should 
reinterpret the “null” language of the first premise as baseline language. If we do this, the 
conclusion follows because it matches baseline modeling. So, the reasoning is valid if we 
understand it as baseline modeling. There are, however, two problems. First, the “null” 
26 
 
language is both meant to do work and actually doing work. Remember its rhetorical role in 
privileging the neutral theory. Reinterpreting “null” out of the neutral–null connection 
misrepresents the actual reasoning. 
Second, users of neutral theory should admit when they are baseline modeling and 
drop the “null” language when measuring relative significance. But the support required for 
baseline modeling goes well beyond that required for null modeling. If they are baseline 
modeling, then they are making two assumptions: random drift, immigration, and speciation 
are causally relevant to patterns of abundance and diversity; and random drift, immigration, 
and speciation are acting in the absence of interspecific competition. Reasons need to be 
given for making these two assumptions, reasons obscured by the neutral–null connection. I 
do not deny that they exist, but they are not clear and must go beyond assuming neutrality. In 
this case, the reasoning has an unjustified premise and is unsound. 
Case 3: The reasoning could follow from a combination of null modeling and 
baseline modeling. But null modeling is distinct from baseline modeling. And the methods 
are in tension with each other when used in sequence. If we begin by testing interspecific 
competition against the neutral model qua null model, then we doubt the causal relevance of 
interspecific competition. If the reasoning invokes it in the conclusion of the argument, it is 
incoherent.  
Case 4: The reasoning could follow from some other reasoning strategy. I know of no 
promising suggestions and so I leave this option open to others to elaborate. 
Therefore, the neutral–null–baseline reasoning strategy produces arguments which 
are invalid, unsound, incoherent, or mysterious. The most charitable interpretation of this 
reasoning is Case 2. When using “null” and “testing” and drawing causal conclusions about 
relative significance, ecologists are baseline modeling. However, using a neutral model qua 
baseline model requires more justification than using a neutral model qua null model. 
What evidence and reasoning supports using the neutral theory to supply the baseline 
model? This could come from null modeling. It is possible to gain support for the neutral 
theory qua explanatory via null modeling, but only when the neutral model plays the role of 
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the original model. Gotelli and McGill (Gotelli and McGill 2006) discuss this procedure. The 
neutral model would have to be tested by an appropriate null model—null with respect to 
random drift, immigration, and speciation. For example, you might construct a model 
analogous to the Hardy–Weinberg equilibrium in genetics where the SAD stays constant over 
time. 
But there is however no reason to limit the sources of evidence for a process’s being 
causally relevant to the model-fit of a pattern.14 Independent support for the neutral theory’s 
assumptions is also a source of evidence.15 In the argumentation critiqued here, being neutral 
is the support given. But neutrality is a mere assumption of the neutral theory does not 
warrant causal explanations.  
 
9. Conclusion 
By calling his theory “neutral” and claiming it plays the role of a “null”, Hubbell 
revived methodological issues that have surrounded the use of this family of terms since at 
least the 1980s. This made possible privileging the neutral theory as accepted until rejected 
and using the neutral model to make causal explanations no matter how well it fits the data. 
To clarify these methodological issues, I distinguish two reasoning strategies: null modeling 
and baseline modeling. When any theory, neutral or otherwise, is privileged and called a null 
model but used to measure relative significance, the conclusions drawn with the neutral 
model do not follow. Ecologists want to use the neutral theory to supply the baseline model 
so that they can apportion relative responsibility to demographic, dispersal, and competition 
processes. To do so, they need to identify their justification, and distinguish it from the 
neutrality of the theory.  
                                                          
14 See Lloyd (1994) for a useful framework for understanding the kinds of evidence that are 
relevant to the neutral theory.  
15 For the same reason, null modeling can directly undermine only the evidence for the tested 
model gained through model-fit. It does not, at least obviously, undermine independent 
sources of support. 
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